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## National Intelligence Daily

**Monday**  
**27 April 1981**

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
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


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


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
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
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POLAND: Moscow Condemns Revisionists

*Moscow over the weekend showed signs of continued concern about the Polish situation by attacking "revisionists" within the Polish party. At the same time, negotiations between Solidarity and the government went relatively smoothly. The military situation in and around Poland remains calm.*

A TASS dispatch on Saturday claimed that there are "revisionists" in the Polish party determined to "paralyze" it, an indication that Soviet Politburo member Suslov's talks with the Polish leadership have intensified the Kremlin's opposition to party liberalization in Poland. The charge by Moscow also places added pressure on First Secretary Kania to oppose far-reaching changes at the Central Committee plenum on Wednesday.

The term "revisionist" is one of the most serious charges that the Soviets can level against another Communist regime, and Moscow used it to describe Czechoslovak party liberals before the invasion in 1968. The TASS article attached this label to the Polish party's rank-and-file members, who have become increasingly critical of the party leadership and have begun to organize what they call "horizontal" links--such as the recent meeting in Torun--to make their voices heard.

There has been no direct mention of the meeting in Torun in the Soviet media, but TASS clearly was referring to it when it claimed that "revisionist forces" under the guise of "so-called horizontal structures" were attempting to undermine the party. TASS' contention that this activity is being conducted outside party statutes is an implicit warning to the Polish Central Committee not to tamper with those statutes, as it seems certain to do, at the plenum.

Talks Proceed Smoothly

Solidarity and the government yesterday concluded six months of talks on a draft trade union law that now will be published for public discussion. Although not

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all of the controversial points were resolved, the draft includes a clause that allows for the registration of an independent farmers' union. [redacted]

The Polish Church, meanwhile, yesterday announced that Cardinal Wyszynski would require lengthy treatment for his illness, implying that he would be absent from public view for an extended period. [redacted]

Military Situation


The military situation in and around Poland is calm



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LEBANON: New Syrian Attacks

*Syrian attacks over the weekend on Phalange positions in the mountains northwest of Zahlah have improved Damascus' ability to threaten traditional Christian areas.* [redacted]

The new clashes began on Saturday when Syrian forces, backed by their Lebanese leftist allies, launched clearing operations against Phalange positions along the key Sannin ridgelines northwest of Zahlah. Syrian troops had seized control of the hills closest to Zahlah two weeks ago, forcing the Phalange out of their vantage points above the Bekaa Valley. Occupation of the Sannin area will give the Syrians control of high ground that overlooks the hillsides and coastline of the Christian heartland as well as complete domination of Zahlah and the Bekaa Valley. [redacted]

The new Syrian military moves not only restrict further Phalange access to the Zahlah area but place Syrian or Syrian-supported troops in a position to carry any future fighting directly into the Christian areas. Syrian guns, moreover, would be in a position to threaten the traditional Christian districts where many families of Phalange militiamen from Beirut have taken refuge during fighting in the capital. [redacted]

It is not clear what Syrian intentions are. [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

The Syrians are, however, in a position to expand the conflict with the Phalange. [redacted]

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
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Even if the Syrians agree at some point to give up the new positions they seized over the weekend, they undoubtedly will turn them over to their allies rather than let them be reoccupied by Christian militiamen. In the months following the civil war in 1975-76, elements of the National Movement held positions in this area,



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WEST GERMANY - SAUDI ARABIA: Schmidt's Visit

*Chancellor Schmidt begins a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia today to learn Saudi conditions for broader bilateral relations, including more balanced trade.* [ ]

Bonn hopes to be able to reduce West Germany's \$3 billion trade deficit with Saudi Arabia. Last year Saudi Arabia provided about one-fourth of West Germany's crude oil imports, and the resulting deficit with Saudi Arabia amounted to 20 percent of West Germany's current account deficit. [ ]

Schmidt wants to increase exports by gaining for West German firms a larger share of the contracts being let by the Saudis for their ambitious development plan. Schmidt, moreover, probably will seek Saudi assurances of continued loans to help cover West Germany's current account deficit. Last year, Saudi Arabia accounted for about one-half of Bonn's foreign borrowing. [ ]

[ ]

The Chancellor hopes to impress the Saudis that Bonn contributes to stability in the Middle East. He will stress West Germany's aid programs for Turkey and Pakistan and will indicate a willingness to consider limited arms sales to moderate Arab countries. [ ]

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**Late Official Returns\***

<b>Candidates</b>	<b>Percent of Total Vote</b>
Giscard	28.0
Mitterrand	26.0
Chirac	18.0
Marchais	15.4
Other	12.6

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\*Represent 96 percent of votes counted.



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FRANCE: Election Results

*First-round results in France's presidential election yesterday set the stage for a close final round in two weeks that will pit President Giscard against Socialist challenger Mitterrand.*



Giscard fell below the 31-percent level he had hoped for but did better than late polls had indicated, suggesting that his recently revamped campaign has begun to take hold. Giscard will now turn to wooing Gaullist voters dissatisfied with his economic policies and his alleged lack of firmness in foreign affairs. The President will need the support of nearly the entire center-right electorate to defeat Mitterrand.

Gaullist party leader Chirac's total strengthens his control of the Gaullists and will likely enable him to extract some concessions--perhaps including a say in selecting a new government--from Giscard in return for his second-round endorsement. The apparent success of Chirac's strong attacks against Giscard, however, may indicate that a significant portion of the Gaullist electorate--polls suggest as much as 20 to 25 percent--might not follow Chirac's example in supporting the President in the second round.

Encouraged by his performance, Mitterrand will move to consolidate his support on the left, as well as aim for a small but potentially decisive share of the center-right vote. He probably will avoid any negotiations with the Communist leaders but will reiterate his promise to "practice socialism" if elected to attract Communist votes. He also will emphasize that a transfer of presidential power to the non-Communist left would be healthy for French democracy--an argument that may appear more credible to moderates and anti-Giscard Gaullists in light of the poor Communist showing.


Marchais' setback--the worst Communist electoral showing in 45 years--will stiffen his resolve to undercut Mitterrand. Party leaders now are likely to instruct party members to abstain or vote for Giscard. They will try to scare moderate voters away from Mitterrand by demanding Communist ministers in his eventual government and perhaps by encouraging minor violence during May Day celebrations on Friday.

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UPPER VOLTA: President Under Fire

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Zerbo has failed to establish himself as a strong leader since seizing power in a bloodless coup last November, and public dissatisfaction with his inability to deal with economic problems is growing. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Zerbo is cracking down on opposition groups--especially the labor movement, which has played a major role in bringing down four successive governments. Some opposition leaders, however, have considerable support and are not easily intimidated. [REDACTED]

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INTERNATIONAL: Weak Cobalt Market

Declining demand in the Free World for cobalt is undercutting efforts by Zaire and Zambia to control the market. The two countries account for 70 percent of non-Communist cobalt production and supply 60 percent of US needs. Zaire has unilaterally reduced its price from \$25 to \$20 per pound, violating its agreement with other cobalt exporters. [REDACTED]

With cobalt inventories at record levels, spot prices could drop to \$10 per pound by the end of the year--down from a peak of \$50 per pound in 1978. Industrial demand for cobalt will remain sluggish because of conservation and substitution resulting from high prices. Despite the market's movement from shortage to oversupply, however, the West remains vulnerable to supply disruptions because of domestic instability in Zaire and Zambia. [REDACTED]

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CUBA-US: Refugee Problems

Havana's decision to force 13 Cuban refugees to return to the US may be an attempt to engage the US in talks on the emigration issue. There have been several indications in recent weeks that Havana is seeking to resume the dialogue that broke down last January. The Castro regime believes that the establishment of a regularized flow of refugees to the US would serve as a safety valve for domestic discontent. The return of the refugees does not indicate the beginning of a new sealoft similar to the massive exodus of last year.

The 13 Cubans originally came to the US by way of the Mariel sealoft but returned to the island last October and were immediately imprisoned. The refugees claim that more than 150 other "Marielista" returnees are being held and that the Cuban Government plans to deport them over the next few days.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

SOUTH AFRICA: The Parliamentary Election

The ruling National Party will have no trouble winning a sweeping victory when South Africa's all-white electorate goes to the polls on Wednesday. The Nationalists retain their solid base in the dominant Afrikaner community and should attract a significant crossover vote from English speakers. Concern over a potential conservative backlash to his cautious efforts at relaxing the apartheid system, however, has led Prime Minister Botha to emphasize the limits of his plans for racial reform and to pursue a hawkish foreign policy line. The stance Botha has taken during the campaign and the postelection problems he is likely to have with the National Party's right wing will limit his room for maneuver on racial policies, Namibia, and other issues of concern to the US.


Botha, who has never before led the National Party in a general election, is seeking a political mandate of his own. He came to power in 1978 as the Nationalists' compromise choice to take over as party and government leader after a scandal over misuse of funds by the Information Department forced John Vorster to resign. Resistance to his racial reforms from the National Party's right wing has prevented Botha from consolidating his authority.

Along with most of South Africa's 4.5 million whites, Botha is opposed to granting significant political rights to the country's 20 million blacks. As Prime Minister, however, he has allied himself with reform-minded Nationalists in pushing cautious proposals for granting a limited political role to the more than 3 million Coloreds and Asians and easing some of the social and economic restrictions on blacks. Rightwing Nationalists believe that Botha's proposals risk undermining the whole system of white control.

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The Prime Minister called elections 18 months early to preempt anticipated rightwing victories in byelections that had been scheduled this spring and to take advantage of South Africa's economic boom. For Botha, the key to the election outcome will be his party's success in padding its parliamentary majority, adding to its share of the popular vote, and otherwise upholding the party's 33-year record of drawing increasingly unified white support. Although Afrikaners make up only 60 percent of the white population, the Nationalists won 135 out of 165 parliamentary seats in the last election and drew an unprecedented share of the English-speaking vote.

#### The Other Parties

Four other parties, three of which are fighting for their existence, are contesting the election. The Progressive Federal Party, representing South Africa's English-speaking "left," became the official opposition after winning 17 seats in the last election. It is the strongest opposition party and advocates dialogue with blacks and movement toward a system of multiracial power-sharing.

The New Republic Party, which has a narrowly based following among English speakers in Natal Province, won 10 parliamentary seats in the last election. Since then, its plan for limited racial reform has begun to look almost identical to Botha's reform program, and its appeal has slipped.

The Herstigte Nasionale Party, founded by ultra-conservative Afrikaner politicians who split from the Nationalists in 1969, wants to strengthen the apartheid system. Although it has run in three previous elections, the party is looking to win its first parliamentary seat.

The National Conservative Party, a new, small and untested Afrikaner grouping, has tried to stake out a political position between the Nationalists and the Herstigte Nasionale Party.

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### The Campaign and Its Outcome

By South African standards, the campaign has been unusually bland. The English-speaking parties have been hard pressed to find safe ground on which to attack the Nationalists, and the National Conservative Party has made little headway at attracting disgruntled Afrikaner voters. Only the Herstigte Nasionale Party has waged a tough campaign, adding heat to some political rallies by playing on white fears that Botha is setting up a black takeover. [ ]

The Nationalists have run a tactically safe campaign. They have portrayed themselves as defending the country against a "total Communist onslaught." The recent raids into Mozambique and Angola were launched with an eye to the elections. [ ]

Domestically, they have put their own feud about racial policy on ice and have tailored their treatment of this central issue with an eye to provincial politics. Nationalist candidates in politically moderate Cape Province, Botha's home base, have praised the Prime Minister's approach to race relations. Botha's name or reform efforts have scarcely been mentioned in the conservative Afrikaner heartland of the Transvaal. [ ]

Botha, however, has adjusted portions of the Nationalist manifesto dealing with racial policy in reaction to opinion poll indications of a conservative trend in the overall electorate. In the process, he has made clear his commitment to the black homelands policy and his opposition to one-man, one-vote. [ ]

The Nationalists will win the election by a landslide and may pad their parliamentary majority by capturing a few seats from the English-speaking parties. The Herstigte Nasionale Party, however, is bound to cut into the Nationalists' total vote, particularly in the Transvaal, and the ultraconservatives might even win a parliamentary seat. [ ]

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Botha, nonetheless, will claim a personal mandate and push ahead quickly with plans to give Coloreds and Asians some parliamentary representation. Once the exigencies of the campaign are past, however, the right wing of the National Party will resume its efforts to thwart Botha's reform initiatives. [redacted]

A head count of sure winners among Nationalist candidates indicates there will be little change in the three main philosophical groupings within the party: the small but vocal group of modernizers aligned with Botha; the larger rightwing group guarding the status quo; and the solid middle bloc whose members shift to the left or right depending on the issue. [redacted]

#### Prospects

The elections thus are unlikely to improve the prospects for significant racial reform in South Africa. By clarifying the limits to his commitment to racial reform during the campaign, Botha may have alienated even those moderate blacks who until now have been arguing that the Prime Minister be given a chance to sell his reform program to the white community. [redacted]

In the foreign policy arena, the hardline Nationalist campaign rhetoric and the recent raids into Mozambique and Angola have already stiffened the determination of black African governments to press for UN sanctions over the Namibia issue and have otherwise soured prospects for any easing of regional tension. [redacted]

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